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Saying No to a European Constitution:
Dutch Revolt, Enigma or Pragmatism?
by Theo A. J. Toonen, Bernard Steunenberg and Wim Voermans
On  June , the Dutch voters said no to the ratification of the “European Constitution”
with a clear majority of  % (at a turnout rate of  %). To many domestic as well as
international observers, this result came as a surprise. After describing the run-up to the Dutch
referendum and the campaign for it, this contribution reviews the various explanations that
have been presented to explain the outcome and tries to put the events in a broader context.
On the basis of these findings for the Dutch case, the authors formulate a perspective on how
to move on from here with the European constitutionalisation process.
Am . Juni  lehnten die niederländischen Wähler die Ratifizierung der „Europäischen
Verfassung“ mit einer deutlichen Mehrheit von  % (bei einer Beteiligung von  %) ab. Für
zahlreiche nationale wie internationale Beobachter kam dieses Ergebnis unerwartet. Nach
einer Darstellung der Vorgeschichte des Referendums und der eigentlichen Kampagne über-
prüft der vorliegende Beitrag die unterschiedlichen Erklärungen für den Ausgang des Plebiszits
und stellt die Ergebnisse in einen erweiterten Kontext. Auf Grundlage dieses Befundes ent-
werfen die Autoren eine Perspektive, wie der Prozess der Europäischen Verfassungsgebung fort-
gesetzt werden könnte.
I. Introduction
On  June , the Dutch people could decide on the “European Constitution”
in a referendum.1 While  % of the registered electors participated in this refer-
endum, a majority of them voted no. To many, the Dutch no in the referendum
about the “European Constitution” came as a shock. To others, it was not so much
a surprise as merely unexpected, particularly in terms of the high voter turnout
and the amount of participants rejecting the proposal that the Dutch government
submitted to their approval. No one – except the wishful thinkers who opposed
the government in general or already belonged to the no-camp in advance –
would at the outset of the referendum campaign have full-heartedly predicted the
1 Among the various publications concerning a European constitution, see Grimm, D.: Does Europe Need
a Constitution?, in: Gowan, P./Anderson, P. (eds.): The Question of Europe, London, , –.
outcome as it actually turned out to be. Predictions of a negative vote where
usually qualified as being of a “fifty-fifty chance” or coupled with an expectation
of a low turnout, perhaps even too low for the referendum to be valid.
Many observers, particularly those outside the Netherlands, seemed to have
expected a landslide in favour of a yes from those “European minded”, “inter-
nationally oriented”, “well-organised”, “anti-European sceptic” Dutch, although it
is fair to say that – perhaps because of this preconceived idea – the international
media and correspondents were among the first to pick up the surprising robust-
ness of the anti-sentiments and the surging momentum of the no-advocates
during the campaign. They were, in fact, alerting many of the Dutch media to the
fact that something remarkable might be about to happen.
In the months passed so far, it has only begun to be evaluated by scholars,
although public debate on the meaning of the no-vote on the “European Consti-
tution” had seemingly ended. The latter occurred only for a few months, if not
weeks, after the event. In the media, the “quarrel” on the aftermath by the end of
the summer had already been reduced again from headlines to small messages in
the margin, at best page  news and the subject of only an occasional letter to the
editor by one European expert or the other. In a few weeks time, public discussion
of an event that in its evolutionary context was quite revolutionary dwindled
from daily news to business as usual.
Remarkably, little serious, let alone effective, “politics of blaming” has occur-
red.2 Only the Dutch governmental communication people in charge of “media
management” during the campaign – not of the referendum communication
campaign itself – rounded up their counterparts from the press when the plot
became clear and made sure that the reconstruction of events in a Dutch national
quality paper (NRC) signalled the message that it was surely not their fault. The
journalists reported how some Directors of Communication – the “spin doctors”
of Dutch government – informally gathered at a restaurant in The Hague six days
before the referendum and concluded that the yes-camp would lose. “They raise
their eyes to heaven when they pass in revue the statements (on the need for
European integration and the ratification of the draft treaty) of their ministers.
[…] There is no communication whatsoever that can cope with that.” 3
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2 Only in July some newspaper commentators indicated that the cabinet campaign contributed to the no-
vote. Koelé and Peeperkorn argued that, according to a confidential report commissioned by the Dutch
government, the cabinet’s yes-campaign actually did cause more harm than good (Koelé, T./Peeperkorn,
M., in: De Volkskrant of . . , ).
3 Giebels, R./Kalse, E./Versteegh, K.: Als we het nou maar beter uitleggen: hoe de Ja-campagne nooit van
de grond kwam, in: NRC, Zaterdags Bijvoegsel, . . ,  (authors’ translation).
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Is the lack of public attention to the question of where to go from here a re-
flection of the consensual nature of Dutch politics? Is it a measure of the political
priority of Europe in Dutch politics? Is the outcome of the referendum a new
Dutch Revolt? And if so, is this against Europe or against the national govern-
ment? Is it to be seen as an anomaly, an unfortunate mistake, a no that is not
really a no? Is it the outcome of an ill-executed mission, or perhaps a “normal
accident” in the context of the Dutch handling of European affairs?
In section II, this article briefly presents an overview of the preparatory pro-
cess, the decision to organise a referendum in the Netherlands, and the devel-
opment of the referendum campaign. Section III reviews the dominant expla-
nations for the failure of the referendum that have so far been put forward in the
media and among academics. In section IV, we discuss why it is difficult to arrive
at a satisfactory explanation unless one puts the events surrounding the referen-
dum in the broader context of a long-term perspective of how the Netherlands
over time has domestically handed, organised, and managed European affairs.
Thus, presented as part of the larger “pattern of Europeanisation” evident in a
country very loyal to the integration process, the referendum outcome in the
Netherlands might be understood as a consistent element of a broader case. In
section V, we formulate some lessons to be learned from this generalised per-
spective about where we ought to go from here, both in the Netherlands as well
as within the broader European constitutionalisation process.
II. The Referendum
The Dutch referendum was held on  June . The high turnout rate of  %
surprised many observers and was interpreted as a success for the initiators of the
event, which also silenced all who uttered doubts about the enterprise. Never-
theless, a majority of voters ( %) rejected the proposed Constitutional Treaty.
By comparison, on  February ,  % of the Spanish electors approved it
(with a turnout of  %), while the French on  May  had voted against
ratification with  % (and a turnout of  %).
The referendum was quite a unique event in the Netherlands. It was based on
a law introduced into the Dutch governmental system not too long ago,4 which in
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4 The Temporary Referendum Act (Tijdelijke referendumwet) entered into force on  January  and
expired on  January . No regular referendum was organised during the four-year period in which
the Act was effective. After the official expiration date its mechanism, system and procedures were used
to accommodate the referendum on the “European Constitution”.
the meantime has been withdrawn, not as an outcome of the vote on the Draft
Constitution, but as part of a broader political debate about the pros and cons of
a (new type of) referendum as a tool within Dutch policy-making. It is, however,
interesting to note that the experience with the referendum on the “European
Constitution” as a whole – at least publicly – is identified as a positive event,
stimulating debate on subjects hardly discussed before among the general public
and revealing a “gap” between political elites and masses that would have re-
mained hidden under other circumstances.
This seemingly masochistic evaluation of the organisation of a referendum as
an unprecedented part of a (lost) ratification process can only be understood in
a broader context and larger set of political developments. The plebiscite on the
“Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” (TCE) was the first national refer-
endum since  April  (a constitutional referendum which took place after a
failed effort one year earlier on  August ). The TCE referendum was, there-
fore, an essentially new phenomenon in modern Dutch national politics. Al-
though proposed earlier, it was decided to organise and set the date for the
plebiscite on the basis of a proposal initiated within Parliament and adopted by
it in February , only four months before the voting actually took place.
It was, indeed, a late start, not only in terms of the effort to organise a referen-
dum, but for other reasons as well. It should be noted that the process of the
Convention leading to the Constitutional Treaty over the period of –
was largely neglected by the Dutch media, the Dutch public as well as by Dutch
politics in general. Even the government did not pay much attention to this pro-
cess, although – after a change in the governing coalition – it decided to not only
send some elderly Statesmen, like the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van
Mierlo, to this Convention, but actually included some more European activist
Members of Parliament in the delegation. It is fair to observe that the Convention
was for a long time largely seen as a high-level study group engaged in a merely
theoretical enterprise.
When the Chairman put the label “Constitution” on the product his group was
in the process of creating, the Convention finally got some public attention in the
Netherlands. But it is no exaggeration to say that the Laeken Declaration of 
calling for a larger involvement of the European citizenry in the integration process
and one of the bases for the Convention leading to the Constitutional Treaty, had
largely gone unnoticed by the Dutch general public, media and politics. From the
viewpoint of the Dutch voter and public opinion, the whole subsequent process of
the Convention was a black box and – in retrospect – a missed opportunity for
public debate. But it is also fair for political leaders to say that such a debate in and
of itself was unlikely to have aroused much public attention and interest at the time.
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Debates on Europe had been tried before with little enthusiasm or response. In
addition, the Netherlands was occupied with other issues: the implosion of the
Purple Coalition of Prime Minister Kok at the end of its second term and the
Fortuyn revolt heralding a massive shift in governmental politics. But even without
this domestic turbulence, it remains highly questionable, whether the Convention
would have received any more attention than it actually did.
The Dutch government signed the Constitutional Treaty in Rome on  Octo-
ber  and, thus, committed itself to the ratification process. At the time there
was some initial talk about submitting the proposal to a referendum. The Junior
Minister of European Affairs (Nicolaï), together with the Minister of Finance
(Zalm), had earlier in this governmental term started to play up and politicise
“Europe” externally as well as in the context of Dutch politics, largely on the basis
of a Stability Pact Agenda and a justified political message that national interests
should play a more significant role in determining the Dutch position in EU
affairs. Until that point, Dutch European Policy was largely legitimised and for-
mulated in terms of its being one of the Founding Members and, therefore,
responsible for supporting the EU ideal. It had brought peace to the old continent
and represented a highly effective process of European integration. The EU af-
forded the Netherlands a say in European and global economic processes on
issues that would have surely affected it anyway. Moreover, the open economy of
the Netherlands had clearly benefited from the creation of a Single European
Market. Over a long period, European and Dutch interests have been seen and
presented as parallel, complementary, and mutually reinforcing. Thus, “what is
good for Europe is good for the Netherlands”.
Several issues came together to influence the Dutch position on the EU in
general and the proposed Constitutional Treaty in particular. The Netherlands
had arrived at a position of net-payership to the Union while facing the economic
need for another round of governmental fiscal cutbacks. Further, observations
saw a slowing pace of implementation of the Stability Pact in nearly all the big
countries – Germany, France, and Italy. And the government was being con-
fronted with public and political questions regarding the entry of Turkey into the
Union. To this list of motivations could have been added the inability of the
government to implement the reforms implied by the Lisbon Agenda, if not for
the fact that the Netherlands itself had not shown such a lukewarm involvement
with this agenda. Several ingredients – like social inclusion as point of departure
for social policy and work-first approaches in social assistance – were actually
included in governmental reform approaches. But they had not been presented as
“European” policies, but as local Dutch inventions by creative Ministers and
Junior Ministers of Social Affairs.
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Not only after October, but also after the February decision – on a surprise
initiative submitted by three parliamentarians 5 – to actually organise a referen-
dum, anything resembling something of a campaign was slow to start. A Referen-
dum Committee – conceived as an independent body, largely consisting of (legal)
experts – was inaugurated with the task of providing a neutral explanation of
what the Constitution was about, produce simplified information material on the
purpose and content of the TCE, provide on a non-partisan basis resources to
advocacy organisations representing the yes- and the no-camps. It is also impor-
tant to note that the government stood back and was forced to adopt this essenti-
ally neutral stance by Parliament, most notably the proponents of the no-camp,
which demanded a “fair campaign” on the basis of neutral information creating a
“level playing field” for debate.
Nobody in the yes-camp full-heartedly seized the initiative to promote the
Constitution. There was a combination of factors at work here. Although the
government had signed the Treaty in Rome, it did not seize full responsibility for
or “ownership” of this act. The State Secretary of European Affairs was probably
wise in not attaching his political position – let alone that of the Cabinet as a
whole – to the outcome of the referendum. Doing the opposite would have given
the debate on the “European Constitution” a very strong domestic dimension. As
a consequence, the government did not take the lead in promoting the proposed
TCE. Indeed, the initiative for the referendum came from Parliament. A majority
of political parties – including the Social-Democrats (PvdA) as the major opposi-
tion party – favoured ratification and were, therefore, expected to campaign for a
yes-vote. All of the parties involved, particularly members of government, treated
the run-up towards the referendum as a “regular” election campaign. In effect,
this meant that they started the campaign only a few weeks before the actual event
and only then tried to persuade voters for their position. One should not “peak”
too early. Over much of the spring, leading Cabinet members reflected full con-
fidence that – once they would get started – they would be able to persuade the
voter. After all, they were supporting a good cause and Dutch voters were con-
sidered to be very European minded.
Some high profile public opinion leaders, however, decided not to delay. While
not yet necessarily opposing a yes-vote, they merely began asking some “tough
questions” about how and why some provisions were added to the Constitutional
Treaty. Clear and to the point answers were infrequently provided by leading
politicians, parliamentarians and members of government alike. By lack of a
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designated stage and scenario for the debate, the most visible part of the debate
took place only at the margin of other news events. General statements on Europe
were presented as answers to specific questions. When asked for reactions to
general statements in the media about the Constitution and its implications,
politicians got themselves into technical details or responded in terms of even
more general statements about the importance of Europe, signalling little actual
knowledge about a process and event that they in effect had largely neglected as
not being part of their prime political responsibility. As a result, the position of
the pro-camp became a bit unreal. It was claimed that “the Netherlands would
place itself outside the European order” and, “economically speaking, the lights
would go out” by voting no. The statement that Europe had been effective in
preventing war was in the media easily translated into that “the minister pre-
dicted a European war in case the proposed constitution was to be rejected”. The
advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the need for gathering more know-
ledge and information about Europe and the meaning of the TCE was interpreted
to the public as saying “that those who felt uninformed should rather not vote at
the referendum”.
This provided the general background in which step-by-step, a very well pre-
pared no-camp took over the initiative and from March onward gradually pushed
the yes-camp more and more into a defensive position. Two smaller parties played
a crucial zealot role in mobilising the media and boosting the confidence of the
no-camp. On the left, the Socialist Party (SP) promoted with remarkable profi-
ciency the old neo-Marxist story on the evils of international capitalism and
Europe as the big business conspiracy against the working class, “the normal
people” when this concept was disconnected from its steely Marxist-Leninist
jargon. This provided a persuasive story about the dangers of building a European
“super state” and everything that would follow from it in terms unchecked poli-
tical control, exploitation of “legitimate interests”, endangered local and regional
labour markets, and massive bureaucracy. The narrative suitably made the under-
lying motives of those in favour suspect as representing deep self-interest rather
than high ideals.
On the other side of the political spectrum was the orthodox protestant
Christian Union, ringing bells based on their detailed knowledge of the ins and
outs of the text of the proposed Constitution and the broader European context
in which it had to be understood. They had clearly read and studied the script
which the Convention had produced. Their being factual and to the point on
detailed aspects of the text was enough to take advocates of the yes-camp off
guard. When needed, they could discuss an issue at a deeper level than could pro-
ponents. The thorough Christian Union campaign – against “Catholic Europe”? –
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insured that, after the referendum, the Protestant Bible Belt once again would
become politically visible, this time as the regional stronghold of the no-camp.6
It also neatly complemented the more populist campaign of the SP with a degree
of credibility about factual knowledge which was rarely displayed by the yes-
camp. This was only matched by those Members of Parliament who had parti-
cipated in the Convention. But they, of course, were readily criticised as having
“vested interests” in defending their proposals and were more than once pur-
posely drawn into discussions of technical details no layman was ever able to
judge.
This combination of competences, with the increasing support of analytically
minded public opinion leaders still only asking the questions, made it likely that
the much anticipated entry into the debate of the Populist Party List Pim Fortuyn
and the Neo-Conservative Geert Wilders – who had recently split off from the
Conservative Party (VVD) mainly because of the support of this party for the
“Turkey dossier” – did not have the impact on the nature of the debate that was
anticipated. The first group was totally invisible while the second was mainly
remembered for the full orange coloured outfit Wilders was wearing once he
decided to get in his bus to campaign. As a consequence, Turkey and international
migration played less of a role in the campaign than anticipated – or hoped for,
depending on one’s point of view. Indeed, it is noteworthy that support for entry
of Turkey into the EU is still slightly higher in the Netherlands than in most other
member states.
On balance, but largely driven by the opposition of the no-camp, the overall
debate was in retrospect more about the ins and outs of the “European Con-
stitution” and the credibility of the “articles of faith” surrounding its interpre-
tation, anticipated impact, and expected implementation than many would have
guessed at the beginning of the year. But this is not to say that the campaigns for
and against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty had been an in-depth
exegesis of the legal texts and all of the appendices belonging to the formal file of
the proposed EU Constitution.
III. Explaining the No-Vote
Many explanations have been offered to clarify the actual outcome. The European
Commission was among the first to produce some findings in the form of a Flash
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Eurobarometer.7 The survey concluded that, as was the case in France and Spain,
younger voters were less mobilised to vote than the older population. Also, the
younger the voter, the more he or she was opposed to the Constitution. Over half
( %) of Dutch citizens aged  to  did not vote, and almost  % in the cate-
gory aged  to  abstained. Manual workers and the self-employed were more
likely to abstain than were other occupational groups, and people living in rural
areas had a lower rate of abstention ( %) than those living in small or large
towns. People claiming that they did not have the necessary information to make
a choice were far more likely to have abstained ( %) than those who felt suffi-
ciently informed. One in two voters indicated that they did not feel sufficiently
informed before they actually voted on the Constitution. A majority ( %) of
those voting yes felt they had all the necessary information to make a decision,
while among those who voted no a majority of  % claimed that they were not
sufficiently informed. According to the survey, the top five of motives to vote yes
were as follows:
• Ratification is essential in order to pursue the European construction ( %),
• strengthens the feeling of a European identity ( %),
• strengthens the role of the Netherlands in the Union/the world ( %),
• is essential for the smooth running of the European institutions ( %), and
• is a first step towards/symbol of a political unification in Europe ( %).
The fifth argument was ex aequo with considerations that the Constitution would
foster economic co-operation in Europe and strengthen the EU over the US. The
top five motives for voting no were as follows:
• lack of information ( %),
• loss of national sovereignty ( %),
• opposition to the national government ( %),
• Europe too expensive ( %), and
• being against Europe/European construction/European integration ( %).
1. Enigma?
In nearly four months time, broad public support for the Constitution had turned
into an effective “no”. Trend data indicate that since the early s the Dutch
population was generally more enthusiastic about the European Union than many
other countries. By the end of , three out of every four Dutch citizens judged
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7 Eurobarometer: The European Constitution: Post-referendum Survey in the Netherlands, Brussels, 
(Flash Eurobarometer ).
EU membership to be “a good thing”, more than the Germans ( %) or the
French ( %). The same survey indicated that  % of the Dutch supported a
Constitution for Europe.8 But this support was effectively not granted to the
version submitted to voters in the June referendum. Support for Europe and
integration in general remained. However, the reported decrease in support for a
Constitution in May/June  – with the campaign in full swing – was sub-
stantial: a  % loss.9 Obviously many people had by then developed second
thoughts based on the ongoing discussion on the version of the Constitution
presented to them as the fulfilment of this general wish for a more integrated
Europe.
Soon after the referendum, however, research made clear that it would be hard
to explain the outcome of the referendum as a sign of declining support for
Europe. To the contrary, analyses of Eurobarometer and the Dutch Social and
Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP) made clear that public support in the Nether-
lands for Europe was among the highest within the EU. Indeed, the Netherlands
has had a rather stable pattern of support ever since the s ( %), peaking at
its highest level in the early s (nearly  %) in the aftermath of the “Europe
” campaign, sliding to an all-time low at the beginning of the new millen-
nium (near  %), but steeply increasing again since / back to almost  %.
In many other countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the United
Kingdom), the recent trend shows a steady decline in support.10
Comparison with other countries holding referendums on the European Con-
stitution is instructive. French public opinion was the most critical of Europe,
and in several respects there was more support for Europe in the Netherlands
than in Spain.11 The idea that the no-vote stemmed from ignorance or being un-
informed is also not supported by the trend information collected by Eurostat.
Although (tested) overall knowledge about Europe is not very high in general for
all countries, according to the reported figures on both objective (do people know
answers to questions on Europe) and subjective (do people feel that they are well-
informed about Europe) knowledge, it was certainly not lower in the Netherlands
than in Spain and France. Again, the opposite was true. In addition, the respond-
ents showed interest in the sense that they would have liked the media to pay
ZSE  ⁄  603
8 Eurobarometer  (); the corresponding figure for France being  %. Aarts, K./van der Kolk, H.:
Understanding the Dutch “No”: the Euro, the East, and the Elite, Research Paper Submitted for Publi-
cation, Enschede, October .
9 Eurobarometer  ().
10 Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP)/Dekker, P./Edderveen, S. (eds.): Europese Tijden: de Publieke
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11 Ibid., .
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more attention to Europe. Contrary to the Spanish population, the Dutch do not
feel that the media reported too often and too positively about Europe. In the
three countries about the same proportion of the population made its mind up
to vote yes or no in the last week before the referendum ( % in the Netherlands
and Spain;  % in France).
The researchers of the SCP concluded that it is impossible to explain the out-
comes of the three referenda with the combined set of variables generally used
and accepted to measure public support, knowledge, and commitment. The figures
vary, but do not amount to a pattern sufficient to explain why two countries
voted against and one in favour of ratification. Thus, one has to start looking for
internal matters determining external behaviour.
2. Too Fast, Too Much?
Figures show that since late  support for the European integration process is
growing again in the Netherlands, after the dip in  and early , which was
probably caused by a post-Euro syndrome. Also, the debates about the lagging
implementation of the agreed upon Stability Pact, at least in the strict Dutch
advocacy and understanding of this Pact, had its impact. It is interesting to note
that the item in the regular monitoring of public opinion scoring the highest is
actually the question on the degree which respondents feel that they have been
well-informed about Europe. The figure jumps from  % in fall  to  % in
spring , with the earlier scores in the previous two years ( and ) only
in the (low)  % level.
In a different survey monitoring the developments of public opinion during the
campaign, it was observed that curiosity about Europe at large had not been
increasing over that period, and support for the idea that one is properly informed
about the EU and its operation declined rather than increased. Respondents
increasingly indicated that they were following the news and considered themselves
informed about the Constitution. Once more, knowing more about the Con-
stitution contributed to an awareness of knowing less about the EU and its opera-
tion. All in all, various research reports show that the no-vote cannot be attributed
to a lack of information nor to being disinterested. Of the yes-voters,  % were not
able to motivate their choice in an open-ended question. The comparable value for
no-voters and the undecided was  %. These are not large numbers, but the dif-
ference is statistically significant in favour for those who voted no.
Clearly, the referendum did something to the self-perception of the Dutch
population in terms of being properly informed. But this did not only not change
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levels of general support for Europe, but also not affect the image that Europe is
moving too fast – a still frequently noted popular explanation of the no-vote.
Over a long period of time, the perceived and the desired speed of EU integration
has been measured. For the Dutch population, the desired speed of European
integration lies well above the perceived velocity.12 But there has been a con-
vergence since the end of the s with perceived and desired speed ranking
equally. The indicated desired velocity of integration has been rather stable since
the early s. On the basis of these figures, it is hard to conclude that a large
proportion of the Dutch population had the opinion that European integration
was going too fast. On top of that, people thinking that integration was going too
fast were significantly more in favour of a Constitution than those not sharing
this opinion.13
Speed or its perception does not provide a convincing explanation for the no-
vote. The same applies for other popular explanations, such as considering
Europe as “too far, too expensive, and too meddlesome”. There has been some
marginal increase in the number of people observing in the developing EU a loss
for Dutch cultural identity. But at the same time, the number of people afraid of
this observed development has decreased. So has the number of those fearing a
loss of power for the smaller member states in the future development of the EU.
The number of people who think that Europe will cost them more money has in
the past year decreased (from  % to  %). This is still substantial, but not
correlated with the preference for or against a Constitution. The numbers of
those perceiveing the EU as a bureaucracy has increased in recent times. But all in
all, these figures do not point to a long-term build-up of a Dutch bubble of dis-
content and resistance to European integration which finally found an outlet in
the June referendum. Thus, one has to start looking for more short-term expla-
nations.
3. Political Irrationality?
The campaign was highly dynamic and full of surprising turns, although it was
conducted within a relatively short time frame. At its peak and in full swing, the
campaign lasted for only four weeks. But even the broader time span of three
months in which the issue was on the table seems short enough for it to have been
caught-up in the hype of momentum – in this case, working in favour of the no-
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camp – or other “psychological processes” standing in the way of a more rational
judgement.
Political debate was indeed intense. The referendum generated a kind of broad
public and often emotional debate that the Netherlands has seldom seen, parti-
cularly with regard to “Europe”. Public opinion went through rapid shifts. Did the
Dutch voter know much or little about the content of the Constitution submitted
to ratification? Aarts and van der Kolk concluded upon the basis of a study quizz-
ing voters several times during the campaign on factual knowledge about the
subject and the content of the Constitution that the level of actual information
and knowledge at the outset of the campaign was modest, but increased sharply
during the campaign. At the beginning of the campaign, a minority was aware of
the fact that the accession of Turkey within ten years is not regulated by the TCE.
Only at the end of the campaign did a majority know the right answer. All in all,
the campaign had made “Europe” a familiar subject of conversation. Although by
far not everybody had a full understanding of the content of the Constitution or
the ratification process in other countries, basic knowledge about the subject of
the referendum and the state of affairs in other countries became widely shared.14
The analyses also made clear that the role of the cabinet in the process as a
whole was negatively evaluated. At the end of April,  % of the population was
reported to think negatively about the role the government played in the cam-
paign. By  May, this increased to  %. Even among those being favourably
oriented towards Europe and intending to approve the Constitution, a majority
were negative about the role of the government. Political leadership did not come
from Dutch civil society organisations either. Many of these simply stayed out of
a discussion that they considered being highly controversial. The role of the
“leading elite”, to the degree it existed, was diffused and largely played by a
considerable variety of independent opinion leaders and newsmakers. And, of
course, in the broader debate there were many European events that could be
singled out as sound bites, juicy news items, or even interactive TV events with
public ballot positions “for the callers”, etc.
Detailed discussions in “focus groups” with people who voted against the
Constitution in June – organised in August – contributed to the image that the
no-vote was the outcome of an intensely felt, but rather broad perspective about
developments affecting people in general.15 Research identified an overall nega-
tive feeling about the direction in which the Netherlands was developing. The EU
606 Theo A. J. Toonen/Bernard Steunenberg/Wim Voermans
14 Ibid., .
15 Anker Solutions: Kom naar de Camping! Tijd voor een Reality Check. Eindrapport Focusgroepen
Buitenlandse Zaken, Amsterdam, September .
dimension was seen as an extension of this. The mood was as follows: We have
nothing against European integration, but the EU is not functioning well. But
when push came to shove, it was a basic lack of trust between Dutch politics and
the population that became the designated battle ground on which Europe lost its
Constitution.
By the time the focus groups were organised, Blair’s plea for a reality check –
albeit yet another politician’s speech – to the European Parliament could be
interpreted as the way forward.16 Particularly welcomed was his appeal for realism
and rejection of a dismissive reaction towards heartfelt concerns and worries on
the part of European citizens inherent in the ongoing modernisation process or
their ability to understand the complexity of policy problems. That Europe
should concentrate more “on the improvement of the lives of people” is the
resonating message with which the British Prime Minister had little difficulty in
linking with Dutch voters as represented by the focus group panel.
It is interesting to note that the higher educated part of the respondents in
particular have for a relatively long time struggled with their European identity.
Responses in focus groups initially picked-up a kind of political correctness – a
logic of appropriateness – which indicated a feeling that they “ought to know
about Europe”, but in fact did not. Knowing about Europe carried a sense of duty;
you have to know about it and you should not really be against it. This fact was
often gradually admitted after the “coming out” of other participants, causing a
chain reaction. The overall image of Europe as bad, a picture which is substantiat-
ed by reference to such easy targets as subsidies not making sense and not help-
ing, abuse of office, red tape, the monthly moving of the European Parliament,
etc.
Most of the lower educated participants showed no problem in expressing
their lack of interest in politics in general and European affairs in particular. The
“negative mood” on Europe turns out to have become an easily spread virus.
Higher levels of education do not provide as strong of a knowledge filter in the
form of a reality check for Europe as the ready projection of a broad spectrum of
various sorts of evil onto the EU. Europe, the EU, nor the Dutch political
leadership gave proponents much in the way of ammunition to rebut intensely
uttered feelings, leaving them more often than not empty-handed in a vigorously
developing debate. And indeed, many of the higher educated in the course of the
process changed their positions from a reluctant support for the Constitution to
an effective no in the referendum.
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All in all, this analysis provides the ingredients for the conclusion that the
outcome of the referendum was the conjunction of a number of circumstances.
There was no bursting out of a long-felt dissatisfaction, nor did proponents go
any deeper into the subject matter than did the no-voters. Rather, a combination
of low political trust – in political leaders, but perhaps also in political self-effi-
cacy – in combination with a highly dynamic process of public opinion-making
seems to have contributed to a sudden politicising of the question of Europe, with
outcomes hard to predict, let alone “control”.17
4. Constitutional Tradition?
So, did the leaders do it, or rather, fail to do it? This is hard to say without paying
attention to the institutional context and constitutional tradition in which they
were bound to operate. There was a stark contrast between the European
Constitution – strong on symbols, principles, and constitutional rhetoric – and
the Dutch Constitution – austere, sober, and functional. The Netherlands ope-
rates within the evolutionary constitutional framework inherited from the Euro-
pean revolutionary year of . As such, it is a country with one of the oldest
current constitutions in Europe.
Among the range of types of constitutions that the Dutch constitutional scholar
Constantijn Kortmann has defined, running from the theological constitution up
to what he calls the “logical” constitution, the European and the Dutch Consti-
tutions are almost on the opposite end of the scale.18 This explains why to some
degree the “European Constitution” caused a sort of a “culture shock” in the
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Netherlands. The suspicion that the TCE met in public debate arising from this
shock was not mitigated, but rather aggravated by the historical lack of consti-
tutional debate in the Netherlands. Dutch citizens are not used to discuss their
Constitution. The last time they did so dates back to , when a political conflict
between the religiously-inspired parties, liberals, and the social democrats that
had dragged on for decades was finally resolved by a constitutional trade-off. In
contrast, the handful of constitutional reforms adopted since then has been quite
technical in nature.
Prudence and gradualism characterise the political and administrative culture
surrounding constitutional development. Thus, much happens behind the screens
of governance. In this respect, the workings of the Convention were treated as the
Dutch tend to treat all constitutional projects. Constitutional change was not the
domain of high politics in the Netherlands. Even the substantial modernisation
of the Dutch Constitution in  did not generate widespread public debate.
Indeed, it went almost unnoticed. Opportunities for public debate on proposals
for revising the national Constitution is further diminished by the Dutch tradition
of allowing periodic elections for Parliament to coincide with the “second read-
ing”, thereby submitting the result of the first reading of the revision of the
Constitution to the electorate. In recent history, discussions on proposals for
constitutional revision in the second reading have always been overshadowed by
the political issues of that moment and by party programmes and candidates.
The Dutch Constitution, though a rigid and written constitution, is unwritten
in the heads and hearts of the Dutch people. This explains why Dutch inhabitants
– as was demonstrated in the run-up to the referendum – know next to nothing
about the actual content of their national Constitution. Some commentators
quite cynically joked that, although the Dutch voters during the referendum
campaign complained that they were not adequately informed on the content of
the “European Constitution”, they were still a good deal better informed about it
than about the Dutch one. Poor knowledge of the national Constitution did in
some strange way cause some confusing and alarming misunderstandings. A lot
of Dutch voters, for example, seem to have been appalled by the fact that Euro-
pean law has priority over Dutch law. To some commentators and to a lot of
Dutch voters, this was seen as a threat to Dutch identity and a sure sign of the
imperialistic nature of the European Union. What was little known then (and
when it was known resulted in considerable indignation) was that the Dutch
Constitution has ever since  had a provision enshrining the priority of inter-
national and EU law (Art. ).
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IV. Gaining Perspective
If we try to explain the outcome of the referendum as a one-time “rational
choice” of the Dutch constituency, it does not take us very far. None of the
explanations is completely satisfactory or would merely lead to the conclusion
that the no-vote was either an enigma or, in reality, not really a no after all. The
Dutch Referendum Study  surveyed a sample of the electorate.19 It concluded
that many Netherlanders still supported European integration, but they increas-
ingly find that the form it has taken is questionable if not utterly disliked. The
Dutch have consistently expressed support for the EU. It is the form that the
integration process has taken, not the idea itself, which was becoming increas-
ingly disliked and rejected.
The surveys indeed show a clear gap between the opinion of the electorate and
the viewpoint of the dominant political parties in the Netherlands on European
topics. The no-vote on the referendum was inspired by this difference in opinion
on European matters, not by domestic affairs or by a general and diffused dis-
content of the electorate with Dutch government or Dutch politics in general.
Unless one thinks that there is only one (best) way to build Europe – and that this
one way was represented by the proposal that came out of the Convention – the
positive interpretation of the outcome from a European perspective is that at the
referendum the Dutch electorate took an independent stand in a European de-
bate. This stand, whatever the consequences, was clearly differentiated from the
usual member state position as represented by the national government. The
Dutch electorate – with its no-vote – thus entered a European political space for
the first time as an independent actor. For the first time ever, a European con-
science, one independent from the nation-state’s policy positions per se, has
emerged and manifested itself in the opinion and behaviour of Dutch citizens.
True Europeans should be happy with the result that no other factors seem 
to account for the outcome of the referendum. Europe has not turned out to 
be less relevant or subordinate to other social and political issues. The public’s
demonstrated lack of trust largely referred to the role of the Dutch government
as a trustee and reliable informant for the European argument, a role the govern-
ment played very poorly by any standards. Yet, despite the generally felt degree of
relief about the clarity and decisiveness of the outcome even within the yes-camp,
the referendum was not been used by the majority of voters as an axe to bring
down the government. The debate was effectively on Europe and the desirability
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and need for the proposed Constitution. While not always conducted on the basis
of the political and social narratives that European experts or the elite might want
to employ, the no-campaign was based on a perceived European reality by those
advocating rejection of the Constitution. At worst, the Dutch electorate was
saying that government should not do what is “good for Europe”, but what is best
for the interests of those they represent. Indeed, it seems that doing so would only
bring the Dutch government in step with the rest of Europe.
At an institutional level, the outcome of the Dutch referendum might, there-
fore, be interpreted as gigantic step forward, which – unfortunately for pro-
ponents – has led many people to vote against the proposed Constitution. It is
unlikely that more or better information or yet another campaign on Europe – as
initially proposed by Dutch Parliament in the aftermath of the no-vote – would
have altered anything. The no-vote cannot simply be pushed aside as an un-
fortunate mistake. The referendum may be perceived as a debacle, but only a
debacle for those acting on an assumption of a preconceived “permissive con-
sensus”.20 This attitude has indeed characterised the attitude of the Dutch public
on Europe and European policies ever since the s. Support for the EU is in
different countries and among different groups based on different motives, not
necessarily connected to the instrumentalities of the integration process, but
often linked to emotions, events, or desires embedded in the history or self-image
of peoples and countries.21
In the Netherlands, “permissive consensus” has been mistaken for uncon-
ditional, longstanding “Dutch public support for Europe”.22 The reality is differ-
ent. Europe has largely been ignored or at least taken for granted. Indeed, as the
SCP researchers observed, “lack of knowledge” is stressed in several polls as the
argument to abstain or to vote against ratification. The argument certainly has a
legitimising effect, like the “no time” or “not asked” options often evaluated in
non-response analyses. But we agree with the SCP researchers that these answers
also reflect a lack of involvement and participation. There has hardly ever been a
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true European debate in the Netherlands. Indeed, until the campaign for the
Constitution, there was hardly an active interest in Europe. As in many other
member states, Europe has been close to citizens, but only as a resource, subsidy,
and negative or positive symbol, not as an institution. It is not necessarily the
electorate that should be blamed for this attitude. The outcome of the referen-
dum signals the gradual awakening of national interests. Not only Dutch public
opinion, but also the media, politics, and the academia have paid very little
attention to European integration in general. It was not until business interests,
the implementation of directives or issues of net-contributorship entered the
scene that social science and public law researchers started to pay attention to
Europe.
There is an abundant collection of complaints about the lack of political inter-
est of Parliament in EU affairs over a long period of time by European policy
advocates, Dutch ministers or other executives having to deal with a European
dossier. From time to time – usually when something had gone wrong yet again –
parliamentarians had to pay attention. But they then often complained, or more
likely simply observed that Europe was not an important issue among the
electorate, and, therefore, not very appealing politically.23
Europe was yet another case of “letting government govern”. It was seen this
way by both the government and the electorate. Europe has been a subject for
specialists: those in Parliament, Government, bureaucracy, science, and society.
Lack of involvement and paying little attention has thus for long been confused
with “support for Europe”. This permissive consensus lasted largely throughout
the strong build up of the European integration process since the late s,
throughout the s, and into the very beginning of new millennium. It generat-
ed some opposition in observations about the sloppy implementation of the
Stability Pact – which is an economic “constitutional issue” and a token test of
trust in European institutions in itself – and in observations about the inability
of various member states to carry out generally needed economic and social
reforms deemed necessary for achieving a healthy economic constitution. The
buck stopped, however, at the referendum.
The Dutch government is and has been among the staunchest supporters of
the building of a Single European Market and the sublimation of this in its logical
consequence of a Monetary Union. When presented with several competing
characterisations, the dominant opinion among the electorate is no longer that
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the EU “is an institution stimulating international trade for the open Dutch eco-
nomy”, but “an institution costing too much and threatening both our jobs and
our social security”. Figures like these at best indicate that there is a gap between
the opinion of the Dutch voter and at least large parts of its political establish-
ment in Parliament as expressed by party positions and official governmental
policy. It is even hard to say whether this gap has increased over time since the
referendum was the first occasion on which researchers found reason to ask the
question and compare the mass and elite opinion.
Most of the political parties that supported the yes-camp have by now openly
agreed that they themselves were surprised by how they had misread the opinions
of their constituencies and about the size of the gap between their policy position
and the opinion of their electorate. But this does not explain why this gap has
come about or what should be done about it. Does it, for example, imply that the
government should have been less co-operative in the European process preced-
ing the signing of the Draft for a Constitutional Treaty in Rome?
Several political parties – including that of the Prime Minister – are already in
the process of adapting their opinion to the – perceived – position of their voters.
This is, of course, the way it is supposed to be in a representative democracy, if
only as a matter of political survival. From a perspective of public choice, popular
sovereignty is a great good and, of course, in political terms the electorate is
always right. But is this the end of the story? Seeing political will as an exo-
genously determined independent variable does not leave EU proponents much
choice other than to find ways to bypass the electorate by claiming that there will
be “no more referendums”, that “this is no subject for a referendum”, or by
incorporating elements of the proposed constitution into a series of piecemeal
adjustments of European Treaties, i.e. “doing it secretly”, or at least outside the
immediate reach of “direct democracy”. The only other alternative is to wait and
hope for enlightenment or a deeper insight among Dutch voters to develop at
some point in the future. There is, of course, little chance that this will happen in
and of itself, unless one is willing to wait for a very long time indeed.
Any gap or distance between electorate and representatives, however, is a two
way street. From an institutional perspective, preferences are not given – certainly
not in a process like this. The outcome of the Dutch referendum could easily be
studied as a case of highly dynamic preference formation. Large parts of the
Dutch electorate in the process seem to have replaced their revealed preference
for a logic of European appropriateness by a stated preference for a European
logic of consequence.
The surprising outcome of the referendum might also be interpreted as part of
a broader pattern. Other unexpected rebuffs of Dutch European policy, albeit less
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dramatic, have occurred, and they seem to have followed a by now familiar
pattern, one also reflected in the case analysed here. Many seem to have forgotten
that the famous Treaty of Maastricht was preceded by “Black Monday”. Briefly,
before the famous summit, representatives of the Dutch Presidency travelled to
European capitals only to find out that their internally and carefully prepared
design for a Federal European Treaty – may we call it a preliminary draft for a
Constitution? – was totally disliked and was likely to be rejected within just a few
days before the meeting opened. Those who were supposed to support it were not
involved in the drafting of the document. In the early s, when studying the
implementation of EC directives was not yet a big deal, the Netherlands found
itself systematically among the laggards within the implementation process. Not
surprisingly, those having to carry out the implementation – at the time the
national departments and advisory bodies – were not involved nor represented in
the negotiation process leading to decisions on the directives. Implementation
problems were, therefore, bound to occur.24
In the middle of the s, two talented young ministers almost got into deep
political trouble over the so-called Securitel case. The responsible ministries had
“forgotten” to bring legal changes to the attention of the European Commission –
a required standard procedure. But they were uninformed largely because they
had not been involved up-front in the design of the process. By the second half of
the s, the Netherlands got into serious trouble over inappropriately used ESF
funding. Again, there were no wrong intentions, let alone corruption. Rather,
severe technical violations of European accounting guidelines stemmed from an
inability to involve the relevant executive parties from the bottom-up, in this case
local and regional governments, labour market institutions, and regional over-
sight institutions.
By the beginning of the new millennium, the Netherlands is once again wres-
tling with the implementation and compliance question, largely for the same
reasons as before. And then the referendum occurred. It turned out to be a recur-
rence of the same institutional pattern. Those needed to make the implemen-
tation of the policy process – ratification – work, in this case the citizens, were not
involved and were largely ignored in the preparation of the Dutch position on
Europe. The politicians in-charge were not informed in detail and with compas-
sion about problems the “executors” – voters in the referendum – were experienc-
ing, nor about the detailed ins and outs of the European proposals. After all, the
advisors and communication specialists anticipated no problems beyond figuring
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out how to celebrate a landslide victory. Again, the political bill for this miscalcu-
lation was served in the process of carrying out European commitments.
In all of the earlier cases, the Dutch administrative system knew how to repair
things. They are proficient. They do not easily make the same mistake twice.
Single loop learning is well organised. But interactive double loop learning, let
alone deutero learning – “learning how to learn” – turns out to be much less
developed and brought into routine practice. Part of the recurrent problem is that
– unlike, for example, the situation in Denmark and the United Kingdom – Par-
liament is hardly politically involved and committed to these processes of handl-
ing European policy-making in the stage of preparation and seeing to it that
relevant interests are selectively but duly represented in designing Dutch Euro-
pean policy. The typical response to these kinds of institutional failures is to
depoliticise the issue, whereas the response should be the other way around via
politicising European decision-making. Only in that way the “Europe of the
administrations” will be able to give interactive EU policy-making the priority
which – in the Netherlands – it should already have had long ago.25
“Structural politicisation” of Dutch European policy-making is necessary to
overcome the ad hoc, uncontrolled, and unexpected “sudden politicisation”
identified in both the referendum and the earlier cases reviewed here. In a re-
action to the outcome of the plebiscite, the Dutch State Council (Raad van State),
as the highest advisory council on institutional matters to the government, has
taken up this line of argument by stressing the mutual interdependencies among
the various levels of European decision-making and calling for a strengthening of
political control and direction at the level of government and Parliament.26
Is all of this only relevant to the Netherlands? Why should the rest of Europe
bother? After all, they are stuck with a stagnated ratification procedure and a
Draft Constitution and probably could not care less about a series of mistakes
made in the Dutch context.
V. How to go from here?
Communication and learning are dynamic and interactive processes. In the con-
text of Europe, they are also political processes. In the Netherlands, the process
leading up to the Constitution and to European integration more generally has
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been treated as a high brow, largely technical and legal project, one that is often
too complex for the average person to comprehend and, therefore, better to be left
to specialists. It was certainly no easy subject for a plebiscite. Many will see this
idea confirmed by the outcome of the Dutch referendum.
We would like to offer a different perspective on the basis of the actual Dutch
experience as represented by the case analysed above. Let us leave aside the question
of whether the Dutch saved other governments from a similar embarrassment
further on in the timetable of the ratification process. More importantly, if any-
thing, the analysis of the Dutch Referendum case might exemplify the argument
that without “the mediatory structures from which the democratic process lives,
the Community would after its full constitutionalization be a largely self support-
ing institution, farther from its base than ever. […] A European constitution
would not be able to bridge the existing gap and would consequently disappoint
the expectations associated with it.” 27 The way forward is, therefore, not to try to
find as quickly as possible some alternative form or forum in which the ratifi-
cation process might still be continued after the dust has settled. Constitution-
making is not a deterministic process. There is choice in institutional variety, not
merely one way in which the European project might be realised.
To begin with, simplification or transparency is indispensable for effective
public debate. Otherwise, people will inevitably create subjective simplifications
of their own, many of which will surely be ill-formed given a lack of rigorous
testing through debate. Without an effective debate, one might have a Consti-
tution, but no Europeans to willingly live by it. Proponents have often used the
argument that the largest part of the proposed Constitution was a codification of
existing European arrangements. Why not make this explicit? 
“As long as the call for a constitution has to do only with the constitutional form of the
existing legal bases for the European Union, to make its goals and structures more
transparent for Union citizens, then this can be accomplished by separating the treaty
elements that in a nation state are typically in the constitution from the numerous
detailed regulations that have crept into the treatise alongside them. The ‘core treaty’ so
formed would thus resemble a constitution in its external form”.28
To the extent that the proposed constitution concealed a call for institutional
reform, a different approach is required. The functional need for the specific
reforms, for the EU, for specific countries, or for the European system as a whole
should be made clear to external public observers, not mathematical insiders or
legal experts only. This will indeed imply that the European constitutional debate
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is set on its feet again.29 The need for reform should be argued and carried out on
functional terms. Why are they needed? An answer might discuss, for example, a
policy that will “improve the lives of European citizens”. Reforms can still be
introduced by amending the Treaties without having to turn them into a Con-
stitution according to the national pattern.30 Eventually, they may well be includ-
ed in the codification process of the core constitution. For such approach, a lon-
ger period of development has to be budgeted. Nice was not “nice”, but it was not
the end of the world either. Many values sought to be guaranteed by the proposed
Constitutional Treaty are already embedded in the existing, unwritten European
constitution and will not easily be lost.31 Working routines could develop into
standard operation procedures within the status of unwritten law, to be included
in the developing system of specific regimentation and bylaws as annexes to the
codified core constitution.
One has to accept that the expansion of Europe sets limits to the ambitions 
to become a fully integrated political Union and that there is a variety of forms
that integration might take. The nation-state model as an exclusive guide for
European democratisation is not the way to go. All of the constitutional debates
have clarified that without a European people to support and control it, the
Union will be neither trusted nor accepted. It will only be neglected by the plural
peoples of Europe. Any slight institutional resemblance to the old nation-state
will put them on high alert.
One also has to accept that – under these conditions – Europe is basically a
joint arrangement of member states bound by their mutual treaties. Initiatives to
strengthen the role of national parliaments in cooperating on EU issues could
strengthen representative democracy. The legal foundation that best fits an asso-
ciation of states is the treaty. European citizens will increasingly either find their
own ways of directly participating in the process Europeanisation or choose the
exit option. They are certainly not always willing to rubber stamp European deals
made by unresponsive elites.
Constitution-building is not merely a legal act, but reflects the working prac-
tices in the various areas of EU policy. In the real, extant, and working consti-
tution of the peoples of Europe, monetary and economic projects directly affect-
ing their interests are considered the most vital and interesting parts of Europeani-
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sation. Under the given circumstances, the implementation of the Stability Pact,
institutional economic reforms along the lines of the Lisbon agenda, and a robust
process of dealing with new and proposed members of the Union – both at the
level of new member states and as a result of international migration – all belong
to the perceived constitution of the European system, whether or not they are
legally incorporated into a formal constitutional framework.
These observations also highlight that “living” constitutions are made in the
functional process. The Dutch Parliament has joined the wider initiative to
embark on a joint project with other European parliaments to start incorporating
the “subsidiarity test” as way to gain more political control over and earlier
involvement within the European decision-making. For the Netherlands this is a
first step in the direction of remedying the faulty institutional pattern identified
earlier.32 Parliament and politics will have to become involved much earlier in the
process. It is also an illustration of how provisions out of an unratified consti-
tution may be incorporated into the day-to-day practice. Accordingly, however,
one has to be aware that this move will face the same risks as the criticism or
doubts that where uttered on the subsidiarity tests when they were still a heralded
part of the proposed written constitution: staying empty symbolic gestures.
These risks can only be avoided by matching (functional) substance to (insti-
tutional) form. “Under the current technological and international conditions,
the functional imperative of democratic will formation can scarcely be fulfilled in
the nation-state framework; this is all the more true for Europe.” Inserting
substance and functional performance into the debate on subsidiarity will
provide “the flowing contents of a circulatory process that is generated through
the legal institutionalisation of citizens’ communication. This is precisely how
national identities were formed in modern Europe.” 33
The concept of subsidiarity has often been criticised as nebulous. The real
problem is not the vagueness of this concept – compare all other great concepts
for institutional design – but the fact that in the European context it has been too
strongly linked to federalism and the idea of a strict division of labour – a cata-
logue of competencies – between different levels of government. In fact, subsi-
diarity as a design principle has a political, procedural quality, which “questions
the need, possibility, and desirability of some kind of a blueprint as the basis for
a ‘European constitution’. Optimal subsidiarity relationships vary from situation
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to situation and are constantly changing” 34. In European history, the subsidiarity
principle used to play a role in demarcating and linking the roles of states and
churches in society and in people’s lives. Under modern – “de-confessionalised” –
conditions, the search is for new values and standards for organisation and
reform across different planes of European governance. This implies that the
notion and concept of subsidiarity rather than to “federalism” has to be linked to
“democracy”. Actually applying the subsidiarity test by parliaments – rather than
merely talking about in constitutional terms – could contribute to a further
political discussion and functional development of the actual working practices
of European integration, not only at EU level, but also between the Union and its
member states. Provided it is not going to be divorced from functional content,
this could contribute to the pragmatic further development of rules that will
become the “real” and “living” Constitution of Europe. As a case in institutional
development, the Dutch referendum illustrates that adversity also leads citizens to
take a stand in a European, rather than a national, political debate. In this way,
also a no-vote contributes to the constitution of a European democratic space.
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